INTRODUCTION

Francis Fukuyama, in his 1989 article titled “The End of History?” and then, as a book in 1992, “The End of History and the Last Man’’, in which he expanded his theses, declared the final victory of liberal democracy in the atmosphere of the post–Cold War period. According to Fukuyama, humanity has completed its ideological evolution with liberal democracy and argued that beyond this, the victory or progress of another ideology is not possible. (Pieterse, 1993) Furthermore, Fukuyama has a Hegelian perspective; that is, history should be interpreted as the evolution of humanity’s forms of political organization, and he argued that this evolution is completed with liberal democracy. However, about thirty years have passed since Fukuyama’s prediction, and during this period the world has experienced situations in which the ideology of liberalism was put to the test amid various crises. Among the circumstances that challenge the “end of history” thesis are events such as Brexit, Donald Trump’s election, the rise of populism, trends toward authoritarianism, and the decline of international cooperation. (Kuhn, 2018)

Fukuyama’s Thesis And The Rise Of International Organizations

According to Fukuyama, with the end of the Cold War, liberal democracy became a universal ideology, and it is not possible for another ideology to gain victory over it. In his view, economic development prepares the basis of liberal democracy by creating an educated and tolerant middle class through technological progress. (Pieterse, 1993) At the same time, focusing on the concept of “struggle for recognition” in the Hegel–Kojeve perspective, Fukuyama argued that human’s basic need is the need for honor and recognition rather than economic interests. He stated that liberal democracy is the best international ideological tool that meets this need for honor and recognition.

In the post–Cold War period, international organizations experienced significant progress, expansion, and deepening. NATO expanded, the European Union deepened, and the World Trade Organization was established. In addition, institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank gained an influential position on a global scale. These institutions have been considered as tools that help spread the principles of liberal ideology at the global level, such as free trade, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

However, the emergence of a second liberal world order is not only based on rules, but also on a structure that has an explicitly liberal social objective and that uses considerable authority beyond the nation-state. (Hooghe et al., 2019) This view of post-national liberalism suggests that states have a more interventionist and more intrusive structure. In this situation as well, it can be observed how international organizations are transformed into a self-destructive mechanism for liberalism.

The Dynamics Of International Organizations Bringing About The End Of Liberalism

Legitimacy Crisis and Erosion of Authority

In the post–Cold War period, international organizations experienced a serious legitimacy crisis along with the increase in their powers. Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks’ analyses indicate that this major increase in the powers of international organizations in the early 1990s triggered a reaction of legitimacy loss in Western societies. (Hooghe et al., 2019; Macharia, 2014) Along with this reaction, those who question the legitimacy of international governance have unveiled a new political schism line. Examples of political fault lines include nationalists opposing globalists and those against immigration, free trade, and international authority.

The crisis of the liberal international order is not only due to external dynamics and power shifts here but also to internal dynamics. With Zürn and Börzel’s study, the core features of post-national liberalism—the increasing authority of international institutions and the strengthening of liberal content—create legitimacy problems. These issues can be examined under two main mechanisms. First, international institutions concentrate decision-making power in the hands of ruling elites of powerful states, leading to double standards where similar situations are not treated similarly.

Second, the use of international authority can invalidate the decisions of elected governments and position universal liberal ideas above popular sovereignty, causing legitimacy crises.

Double Standards and Equivalence in International Bodies

One of the major legitimacy-crisis-causing issues for international organizations is double standards. For example, the United Nations Security Council permanent members’ veto power has led to selective application of international law. The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq occurred without UN Security Council authorization, while the 2011 Libya intervention was conducted with a UN Security Council decision but faced criticism for potentially causing a regime change by Russia and China. The United States accepted institutional constraints to form alliances against the Soviet threat during the Cold War. However, with the end of the Cold War, these constraints were no longer deemed necessary. The United States’ concerns regarding NATO expansion, the functioning of the World Trade Organization, and policies promoting democracy have also contributed to international organizations no longer being the main pillars of the liberal order.

In addition, international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank have imposed Washington Consensus policies such as privatization, deregulation, and liberalization on developing countries, increasing inequality and poverty and contradicting liberalism’s universal welfare promise. The lack of social-democratic redistribution mechanisms to protect the inevitable losers of the capitalist economy further erodes the legitimacy of liberalism.

Erosion of the Inner-Outer Distinction

According to Jahn’s research and analysis, the historical success of liberalism lies in the sharp distinction between domestic and international realms. This separation allowed liberalism to manage internal contradictions. For example, liberal states have promoted the rule of law and democratic rights domestically while pursuing power politics and colonialism abroad, contradicting liberal principles. Since Locke’s theory, the founding of liberalism required privatization of shared property abroad, i.e., colonization.

However, the success of international organizations has eliminated this domestic-international divide. With the consolidation of the global liberal order, citizens of liberal states have seen that investments and jobs are exported rather than imported as foreign economic benefits. Political conflicts have been imported into the domestic sphere in the form of refugees and migrants rather than exported. (Jahn, 2018) The globalization of human rights questions traditional citizenship-based identities and their privileges.With these and similar developments, the economic, political, and ideological foundations of liberalism have been eroded.

Economic Crises and the Collapse of Liberalism’s Legitimacy

The 2008 global financial crisis dealt a serious blow to the legitimacy of liberal ideology. Before the crisis, free-market policies imposed by the IMF and the World Bank caused repeated crises in developing countries. However, the 2008 crisis, unlike others, emerged in Western developed countries and demonstrated that the welfare promised by neoliberal policies was an illusion.

From a macroeconomic perspective, the ratio of private debt to GDP in several economies has surpassed the historical peak of 1929 (Jahn, 2018). The stark contrast between bank bailouts and ordinary citizens losing their homes due to debt has reinforced the perception that liberal universalism is a veil. This has empowered right-wing populist movements’ claims of ‘corrupted elites’ and deeply eroded trust in liberal institutions.

The 2008 financial crisis and the European debt crisis have revealed that international institutions such as the IMF and the European Central Bank make decisions behind closed doors without accountability. These ‘moments of visibility’ have exposed the criticism-ready features of post-national liberalism and deepened the legitimacy crisis.

International Organizations Crises: Case Studies

Nato and Collective Security Crises

NATO was established as a collective defense organization against the Soviet threat during the Cold War. However, after the Cold War, it transformed into a ‘means’ of collective defense, which brought serious legitimacy problems. For example, NATO’s 1999 Kosovo intervention is criticized from an international law perspective for taking place without the authorization of the United Nations Security Council. NATO’s 2011 Libya intervention was carried out with UN Security Council approval but was labeled a ‘Trojan horse’ by Russia and China due to its outcome of regime change (Börzel & Zürn, 2021).

Cvijic’s analysis, using Kosovo as an example, highlights the boundaries and contradictions of the humanitarian intervention doctrine. This intervention by NATO without seeking the United Nations Security Council’s consent violated fundamental norms of international law and contradicted the principle of the territorial integrity of sovereign states. This has increased distrust of rising powers like Russia and China in the Western-led international order and led them to place greater emphasis on the norm of ‘sovereignty’.

Complaints by the United States about burden-sharing within NATO have peaked under the Trump administration and have called into question the alliance’s future. However, complaints that the United States is being exploited by NATO allies predate the Trump administration, even though the US stance within the alliance is highly prominent. NATO’s expansion and mission ambiguity have also weakened cohesion within the alliance.

IMF and World Bank Crises

The Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, have eroded the legitimacy of liberalism with neoliberal policies called the “Washington Consensus” that they impose on developing countries. The austerity policies the IMF applies to crisis-affected countries have deepened economic stagnation and increased social unrest. That these policies were abandoned by developed countries after the 2008 global crisis has clearly revealed the IMF’s double standards.

According to Jahn’s historical analysis, the liberalization, deregulation, and privatization policies imposed by the IMF and the World Bank have increased poverty and inequality in developing countries and fed political unrest. (Jahn, 2018) The responses against these policies have led to the rise of left-wing populism in Latin America (e.g., Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia) while increasing distrust of liberalism in other regions.

Europe and the EU

The European Union is the most advanced example of post-national liberalism and the organization that has experienced the crisis of the liberal order most intensely. According to Bagger’s analysis, Germany’s post-1989 worldview was based on the assumption that history would inevitably progress toward liberal democracy. This assumption fueled the belief that European integration was ‘irreversible’.

However, the 2015 refugee crisis made the EU’s liberal authority visible and tangible, and it deepened divisions among member states. According to Zürn and Börzel’s research, EU member states adopted different strategies toward the refugee regime. Strong liberal states like France and Germany pursued a ‘reform’ strategy, while Hungary and Poland rejected the EU’s authority openly with a ‘dissent’ strategy. These developments have shaken the EU’s liberal vision based on shared values and solidarity.

Brexit has overturned the assumption that the European Union is ‘irreversible’ and has exposed the fragility of the liberal integration project. (Kuhn, 2018) The decision by the United Kingdom to leave the European Union has shown that nation-state sovereignty still presents a strong alternative to international institutions.

The United Nations Security Council and Humanitarian Intervention Crises

The United Nations Security Council has taken on a more liberal and more authoritative identity in the aftermath of the Cold War within the framework of humanitarian intervention and the R2P (Right to Protect) doctrine. However, this development has also brought serious legitimacy issues. According to Zürn and Börzel’s work, it has shown that the Security Council’s and the International Criminal Court’s powers are used in an unequal and illegitimate manner.

In particular, African countries have criticized the ICC for investigating only African cases. They have described it as ‘neo-colonialism’ and ‘race hunting’ and have threatened to withdraw from the Rome Statute. (Börzel & Zürn, 2021) Russia and China, on the other hand, have emphasized the norm of sovereignty against the humanitarian intervention concept and adopted a pushback strategy, also starting to use their veto powers more aggressively. These developments have sidelined the collective security system, a cornerstone of the liberal international order.

Cvijic’s analysis shows the limits of the humanitarian intervention doctrine in the Kosovo example. The intervention conducted by NATO without seeking UN Security Council approval became illegal under international law, confirming the principle that “hard cases make bad laws.” (Cvijic, 2007)

Populist Reaction And The Collapse Of The Liberal Order

The most important factor in ending liberalism by international organizations is the populist thoughts and reactions triggered by these organizations. As Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks also noted, the wave of institutional reforms in the 1990s caused rapid increases in international trade, migration, and economic inequality, which created unprecedented opposition to international governance. (Hooghe et al., 2019) This opposition developed along two main branches: the radical left and radical nationalists.

Left opposition does not fundamentally reject the powers of international organizations; rather, it demands more international authority. Radical nationalists, on the other hand, reject international organizations in principle and advocate reclaiming national sovereignty (Hooghe et al., 2019). The main difference between these two forms of opposition shows the depth of the legitimacy crisis of the liberal order. The rise of right-wing populist movements can be explained not only by economic factors but also by cultural backlash. According to Inglehart and Norris’s theory of cultural backlash, groups that were once dominant experience status loss as universalist standards are applied and react to it. (Jahn, 2018) However, this cultural explanation neglects the historical impact of economic crises on the rise of authoritarianism, nationalism, and xenophobia. The legitimacy crisis of liberal universalism is essentially an information crisis. Liberal ideology struggles to explain itself in the face of its universalist agenda’s failures, which lays the groundwork for populist particularism. (Jahn, 2018) The failure to deliver prosperity and stability promised by liberalism strengthens the discourse of “degenerated elites” and erodes trust in liberal institutions.

Fukuyama’s Legacy: From The End Of History To The Return Of History

Fukuyama’s thesis has been criticized in many respects. As Bagger noted, the title ‘The End of History’ is regularly criticized as proof of the naiveté of post-1989 optimism. (Bagger, 2018) Fukuyama has systematically ignored the problems of liberalism. He did not adequately address the tension between liberal universalist claims and historical practice. For example, he explains Black poverty in the United States not as an intrinsic product of liberalism, but as the legacy of slavery and racism. Thus, he has stripped liberalism of its historical responsibilities. (Pieterse, 1993)

One of Fukuyama’s greatest weaknesses is conceptualizing liberal democracy within the nation-state framework and excluding global issues. This approach also hides liberalism’s historical relationship with imperialism and its double standards on the international stage.

With the end of the Cold War, the expansion, progress, and deepening of international organizations seem to confirm Fukuyama’s thesis, but the crises and contradictions these developments create have led liberalism into an unexpected crisis. From the German perspective, as Bagger also noted, ‘The real lesson of 1989 was never about the inexorable path of history; on the contrary, the history of reunification represents hope even in the worst conditions.’ (Bagger, 2018)

CONCLUSION

International organizations have brought about the end of the liberal order predicted by Fukuyama through three main mechanisms. First, after the Cold War, international organizations have become excessively expansive and excessively liberal. This has been perceived as a threat to state sovereignty and national identities, bringing nationalist-populist criticisms and movements. United Nations.

The increasing powers of institutions such as the Security Council, NATO, the European Union, and the IMF have experienced a legitimacy crisis because they lack democratic accountability. Secondly, double standards and inequalities in the implementation of international organizations have strengthened the perception that liberal universalism is a façade. The United States’ invasion of Iraq, NATO’s interventions in Kosovo and Libya, the IMF’s austerity policies, and the European Union’s disunity in the refugee crisis have shown how far liberal principles can be stretched in favor of the powerful. Lastly, the success of international organizations has eliminated the inside–outside distinction that is essential for the survival of liberalism. Globalization and the expansion of liberal institutions have led to the export of economic benefits abroad and the import into the domestic sphere of political conflicts such as refugees, terror, and migration. This situation also has eroded liberalism’s domestic support base and has legitimized the “wall-building” policy.

Fukuyama’s “The End of History” thesis, while proclaiming the final victory of liberal democracy, assumes that international organizations will also be the institutional instruments of this victory. At the point reached today, however, the future of the liberal international order is uncertain.

Reforming liberal institutions and making them more inclusive, and addressing the economic and cultural problems caused by populist reactions, is of critical importance for the survival of liberalism. However, as Jahn also warns, the fact that liberalism needs a non-liberal “other” in order to develop constitutes the fundamental paradox of liberal universalism. (Jahn, 2018) This paradox, then, will continue to remain the greatest weakness of Fukuyama’s “The End of History” thesis.